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IN THE 
SUPRE!1E COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEERCO, a Partnership, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 15925 
BOISE CASCADE AND 
SANFORD CORPORATION, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPOnDENT 
LEERCO 
~lATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a product liability action under which 
Respondent claims damages as a result of having used 
appellant's product consistent with the labelling on the 
product. After doing so, Respondent claims that the pro-
duct turned yellm.;r, damaging the items to which it vras 
applied. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COL~T 
The case was tried to a jury before the Third 
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District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. The jury, 
upon special interrogatories, rendered judgment for 
respondent as prayed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment entered by the Trial Court be affirmed. 
STATEl1ENT Or THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts 
contained in Appellant's brief with the exception of the 
following: 
1. The next to last sentence of paragraph 
one (1) of nage four (4) is argument, not fact. Though 
the testimony referenced by appellant was given, it was 
clearly contradicted by respondent's president who 
testified that (a) Leerco needed the original damaged 
mosaics for updating (T.93)*, (b) that the damaged mosaics 
were unsuitable for use in making new negatives, and 
(c) that despite the most careful handling, the negatives 
became damaged through use and need to be replaced (T.62-66). 
2. Paragraph one (1) of page five (5) is mis-
leading. At T. 78-9, Leerco's president testified that 
by use of Exxon billing records he became satisfied that 
"T" designations refer to the transcript of proceedings. 
-2-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the yellow mosaics were created during the time Sanford, 
rather than Best Test Cement was being used. 
3. The testimony of Sanford's vice president 
concerning t"he "coverage" of the cement was given. How-
ever, both logic and other testimony which the jury ap-
parently believed, controvert what was said. First, 
his assertion that the addition of "thinner" does not 
increase the volume is patently absurd. Though that may 
be true when the thinner is used to thin drying cement, 
it w-ould not be true if thinner were used to thin down 
the consistency of fresh cement. Second, no tests were 
performed by either defendant which involved use of 
a squeegy in insure only a minute quantity of cement 
between the surfaces cemented as was done by Leero(T.85). 
4. The "testimony" of appellant's "photographic 
experts" at page seven (7), is also something short of 
a statement of fact in light of Lindsay's testimony 
that the yellov7 mosaics w·ould not produce usable nega-
tives (T.83, 85, 86). 
5. The factual statements in paragraph two (2) 
of page nine (9) about "photographic yellowing" are all 
well and good, but an examination of the Mosaics ~vhich 
are in evidence make it perfectfully clear that it is 
the Sanford's Cement itself which has turned color. 
-3-
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6. Respondent does not argue \vith the asser-
tions on pages nine (9) and ten (10) of appellant's brief 
about the sterling general quality of appellant's product. 
~vhat cannot be controverted is that if one scrapes a 
quantity of that product off the damaged mosaics in 
evidence, it is not "transparent" and clear but yellow 
and ugly. Examination of the mosaic's clearly shows that 
the photos on them have been turned yellow by the cement. 
ARGllHENT 
For purposes of this argument, both appellant's 
points will be treated as one. And, though they are 
phrased as legal niceties, both concern one question: 
Did plaintiff-appellant put on a prima facie case which 
was sufficient to support the verdict? It did. 
A. It was "possible" for Sanford's Cement 
to have caused the Hosaics to turn yellow. Appellant 
argues that this is impossible because only 3 1/2 gallons 
of Sanford's r:ement was used by Leerco and "every single 
witness, including Leerco's president, testified that 
one gallon of Sanford's Rubber Cement would made seven 
mosaics." (There is no transcript reference to the 
asserted evidence of Leerco's president). The real basis 
for this argument is the testimony of Sanford's vice pres-
ident that one gallon would make seven mosaic's, and 
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that of Pembroke's man 1r1ho ran tests in 1vhich one gallon 
made six mosaics. ~espondent asserts that if these tests 
and the testimony thereabout do not constitute the evi-
dentiary equivalent of Genesis 1:1, then this argument 
fails in light of the jurv's verdict. In fact, the 
tests are desoositive of nothing. At T. 308-309 Francis 
Gilbert, of Sanford, testified that one gallon of cement 
covers about 60 to 80 square feet. Nothing was estab-
lished as to the foundation of this assertion. At 
T. 333, et seq, Halter Chitty of Pembrokes states that 
he personally ran some tests on coverage and that on plain 
paoer, one quart covered 1 1/2 3 x 4 sheets for 18 square 
feet which indicates a gallon would cover 72 square feet. 
Nothing was established regarding the manner of apolica-
tion, testure of the paper or thickness of application. 
On the contrary, Leerco's president, in describing a 
test on plaintiff's Exhibit 19, indicates the use of a 
squeegy to get the air and excess cement out from be-
t1•'een the tHo surfaces glued together. Common sense 
indicates that this procedure would remove all but 
the thinnest of films of the ceJ11ent; a far cry from 
dabbling it on with a brush as one would usually do. 
Undoubtedly, the amount of cement used vmuld be less than 
1/3 the normal amount, especiallv if it was thinned. 
-5-
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These tests proved nothing and the assertions about 
coverage made by plaintiff's witnesses were properly 
ignored by the jury. The estimate of the cost of ce-
ment for each mosaic by Mr. Lindsay does not support 
appellant's claim. 
B. The evidence clearly established proximate 
cause. Lindsay testified that the first yellow mosaics 
were made "about when" they started using Sanford's 
(T. 78) and that after they quit using it, the mosaics 
quit turning yellow. In order to test the theory of 
causation Leerco spread Best Test on one side of paper 
and Hylar and Sanford's adjacent to it. Low and behold, 
the product of the test, plaintiff's exhibit 19, shows 
that the Sanford side turned yellow and the other did 
not. Surely, the jury cannot be criticized for basing 
it's findings on causation on this utterly plain evidence. 
As to the asserted violation of the label in-
dications for the product, Mylar is an apparently inert 
plastic. Physical examination of the damaged mosaics 
makes it fairly clear that the mylar did not cause the 
yellow stains. However, appellant makes the argument 
here (at page 15) and made it to the jury, that photo-
graphic paper isn't included in the meaning of "paper" 
as that term is used on Sanford's label. The jury didn't 
bu·t that argument and neither should this Court. As the 
-6-
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special interrogatories make plain, the jury felt that 
if the basic property of the item to which the cement 
is applied is paper, the customer should have no obliga-
tion to separate among those v7hich are dyed, have ink 
on them, have emulsions on the front or may be shaped 
like party hats in determining which they can use this 
cement on. The can said ~· Leerco used it on ~~ 
and was damaged. It is entirely proper that appellant 
pay for the damage. 
C. The case law. Not one case cited by 
appellant is relevant to this lawsuit because most 
relate to products applied to the skin, a matter ~ilhere 
allergic people are best able to prevent the harm and 
have properly been saddled with the responsibility of 
doing so. Here, we are not involved with exotic beauty 
!)otients or things you put in your eyes. He are talking 
about one of the really mundane products in the world: 
rubber cement. It's label contains no hint that it is 
different from all other rubber cements or that it is 
unsuitable for any purpose except eating it, rubbing 
it on your skin or breathing it's fumes. 
The only other case cited by appellant appears 
to have been inserted to support it's redundant and un-
supnorted claim that the yellowing ,.;as caused by impro-
-7-
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per photographic processing. As indicated, this argu-
ment is rendered absurd by exhibit 19 on which one sheet 
of photogranh was discolored by Sanford's and not by 
another brand. Cause and effect are clearly established 
and Price v. Ashby's, Inc. is inapposite. 
D. The line of cases to which this Court's 
attention should properly be drawn is that which estab-
lishes that jury verdicts ought not to be disturbed over 
quixotic arguments as those presented by appellant in 
it's brief here. The Court has stated the same rule 
in many forms. Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176, 11 
U. 2d 389 (1961) holds that a jury "verdict must be sus-
tained if 'substantially supported' by the record". In 
Owy-hee, Inc. v. Robbins l1arco Polo, 407 P.2d 565, 17 
U.2d 181 (1965), we find that an appellant from aver-
diet must prove that his evidence was so clear, credible 
and undisputed that all reasonable minds uould find 
that his view of the facts and right to recovery has 
been established. Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 8 U.2d 
261 (1958) holds that appellant must show that there 
is "no reasonable basis in the evidence on which the 
trial court [jury] could have rationally thought that 
the requisite degree of proof was met." 
Furthermore, on appeal the verdict is accorded 
-8-
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the benefit of every evidentiary and legal doubt.Wbite 
v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (1976); Bezner v. Continental 
Drv ~leaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (1976); Lee v. Howes, 
548 P.2d 619 (1976); Bullock v. Ungritch, 538 P.2d 190 
(1975); and Steele v. Wilkinson, 349 P.2d 1117, 10 U.2d 
159 (1960). This Court took an even more adamant view 
when it held, in Hoggan & Hull & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 
414 P.2d 89, 18 U.2d 3 (1966) that on an appeal from a 
judgment for plaintiff, the evidence favorable to plain-
tiff must be considered to the exclusion of contrary 
evidence. 
These rules were succinctly stated in tandem 
in Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 427 P.2d 387, 
19 U. 2d ll9 (1967) Hhere this Court held that a review-
ing court reviews the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the trial court's findings and will not disturb 
them if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to 
sustain them. 
A similar rule has uniformly been held to ap-
ply to motions for directed verdict. In this case, the 
rule would apply both to defendant's motion for directed 
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
In Rhines v. Dansie, 472 P.2d 428, 24 U.2d 375 (1970) 
this Court stated the following rule: 
[Granting defendant's motion for dir-
-9-
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~cted ver~ict] 11as tantamount to grant-
~n8 a mot~on for a non-suit, and >~e 
must reverse the ruling if the evidence 
was such that reasonable men could ar-
rive at a different conclusion. 
Citing Merrill v. Oregon Short Line Railroad, 81 p 85, 
29 U 2641. Accord, Anderson v. Gribble, 513 P.2d 432, 
30 U.2d 68 (1973). About the lav1, therefor, there is 
no substantial question. 
That the plaintiff-respondent met it's eviden-
tiarv burden in all respects is sho\•m without resort 
to the testimony. An examination of the physical exhibits 
makes the facts plain. A look at Mosaic exhibits which 
James Lindsay testified were made by Leerco prior to 
the use of Sanford's cement shows that but for slight 
discoloration around the edges, they are without flav1. 
On the contrary, mosaic exhibits produced while Sanford's 
was in use are in various stages of discoloration. If 
one will (as was done by counsel before the jury and 
likely by the jury itself) scrape a small amount of the 
cement itself off the discolored exhibits, it will be 
plain to see that the Sanford's cement itself has dis-
colored and discolored the photographs to which it has 
been applied. Similarly, such an exmination will show 
that a reasonable man could conclude that the mylar plas-
tic had no effect on the cement. Such examination will 
-10-
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also show that a reasonable man could conclude that the 
"yellmving" react"_on occurred within the cement itself 
or by the relationship with the paper used in the de-
veloped photographs. From this, the jury concluded 
that the cement was the proximate cause of the discol-
oration (See special interrogatory No. 2). Special 
interrogatories number 3, 5 and 9 show plainly that the 
jury believed that respondent did not assume negligent 
in any way in it's use of appellant's product. Never-
theless, special interrogatory Number 8 indicates that 
the jury believes Leero "misused" the product by using 
it in a manner vJhich could not reasonably be for seen by 
appellant. The other special interrogatories plainly 
resolve any possible inconsistency here. Interrogatory 
number one (l) contains the general conclusion that 
Sanford was negligent. Interrogatory number seven (7) 
shows the jury's belief that the cement performed in a 
manner which breached the warranties and representations 
stated on the label (Appendix to appellant's brief). 
Read in tandem, it is plain that the jury believed that 
the term "transparent" thereon coupled with use of the 
generic and unrestricted '#ord "paper" in describing per-
missible use of the product, could lead a reasonable 
man to conclude that he could put the cement on any 
-11-
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kind of paper without having it's color affected. There 
is certainly nothing absurd about that. Plaintiff's 
exhibit 19 plainly shows that the cement did not meet 
this warranty specification. And, though the chemical 
reason for the failure was not proven, the fact of the 
failure has been proven beyond any doubt by that exhibit. 
Now, appellant focuses on respondent's failure 
to prove chemical causation. Such proof is not required 
under our laH once ulimate causation has been shown as 
Has done here by Exhibit "19". In Utah Coop. Association 
v. Egbert Huderli Hog Farms, 550 P.2d 196 (1976) this 
Court concerned itself with a claim by plaintiff that 
hod feed purchased from defendant had contained Salmonella 
bacteria which killed it's hogs. The Court first held 
that when defendant sold hog feed it ought to have rea-
sonably expected it would be fed to hogs so as to sad-
dle defendant with an implied warranty. The same rat-
ionale applies here where defendant's label said you 
could put the cement on paper. The hog feed wasn't re-
stricted to Berkshires any more than this cement was re-
stricted to use on plain Hhite bond. "Hogs" are hogs: 
"paper" is paper (including photographic paper). Second, 
the Court held that the evidence of the source of the in-
fection didn't have to be proven to an absolute certainty 
-12-
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so long as plaintiff adduced "substantial evidence" to 
support the "likelihood" that the infection came from 
the feed. Similarly, in this case, though plaintiff 
did not prove the exact chemical cause of the discolora-
tion, the physical exhibits plainly show that the cement 
is the "source" of the problem. 
The issue of "causation" >•laS also addressed 
in Christopher v. Larsen Ford, 557 P.2d 1009 (1976). 
There, the '"arranty relied on 'vas a general statement 
by a retailer of Hobile homes that the vehicle was fit 
for it's intended use. After having disposed of seller-
appellant's warranty arguments this court turned it's 
attention to the seller's claim that plaintiff had failed 
to show that defects cognizable under the warranty had 
caused the performance deficiencies of which plaintiff 
complained. Plaintiff had called an expert who stated 
his assessments of the defects and stated that they v;ere 
the reasons the vehicle wasn't fit for it's intended 
use. In affirming the judgment, this Court simply said: 
... Notwithstanding the defendant's 
contentions with respect thereto, 
the testimony of Mr. Haslam concern-
ing the defects in the motor home, 
coupled with his opinion that because 
of those defects the vehicle did not 
meet the just stated requirement [that 
the motor home be fit for the "usual 
and ordinary purpose it's intended use), 
-13-
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provided a sufficient basis to jus-
tify permitting the jury to pass on 
that issue. 
In the instant case, the jury had appellant's state-
ments about it's product in evidence (Appendix to appel-
lant's brief). It found the statements to contain a 
warranty. A substantial portion of Mr. Lindsay's testi-
mony constitutes his opinion that the Sanford's cement 
caused the discoloration (T. 75-76, 79, 83-86, 350-1). 
Under the ruling in Christopher, supra, that is enough 
to take the issue to the jury. The jury believed the 
overwhelming persuasive evidence, both physical and test-
imonial, adduced by plaintiff-respondent. It disbe-
lieved the inconsistent, speculative and often plainly 
irrelevant proofs of defendant-appellant. It thought-
fully ansv1ered special interrogatories which specify 
the entirely proper basis of it's verdict in detail. 
That is all the law requires. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, plaintiff-respondent 
respectfully prays the Court to affirm the jury's verdict 
and the judgment rendered thereon. 
Dated this ~tb--day of June, 1979. 
204 
-14--------------------------------
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